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1. Classification of Decision Problems 
In reviewing modern l i terature on decision making one observes tha t  most 
often i t  is  defined as a process of choosing a decision alternative characterized by 
multicriterion estimates. Multicriteria problems a r e  widespread due to the i r  
proximity t o  numerous real-life situations in which a number of different but 
essential parameters of the presented problem have t o  be taken into considera- 
tion. Let us begin with the classification of multicriteria decision making problem 
~41. 
The f i r s t  level of classification is existence (or  absence) of an  objective 
model representing the r e a l  problem. There i s  a class of decision making problems 
in which i t  i s  possible to build a reliable quantitative model as we do  in operations 
research.  In this case,  the quality of solution i s  estimated by many cr i te r ia .  The 
second wide class of decision making problems i s  the class in which we have only 
subjective model - decision maker's perception of reality. 
With respect  to the amount of information available to a decision maker, we 
can divide decision problems into two quite different classes: problems in which 
the decision maker can himself be an  exper t  (as he o r  she  i s  able personally t o  
evaluate the decision options both as a whole and by separa te  c r i te r ia )  and prob- 
lems in which the roles  of the decision maker and the experts  involved differ con- 
siderably. 
I t  i s  character is t ic  of the f i r s t  class of problems that  the decision maker has 
a holistic simulacrum of alternatives,  i.e. a 'gestalt'. Very often this gestalt  is  
much more meaningful than i t s  formal presentation through a set of estimates on 
multiple cr i ter ia .  Many problems of this kind a r i se ,  fo r  example, when a buyer 
chooses everyday commodities [I]. Hereafter  we shall r e f e r  t o  this class of prob- 
lems as holistic choice problems. 
The second class of problem is inherent in cases in which the decision maker 
alone does not have enough information t o  perceive the character is t ics  of the  al- 
ternatives. Here, the relevant data a r e  furnished by the respective experts .  The 
decision maker specifies the set of parameters (cr i ter ia)  defining his attitude to- 
ward the problem under consideration, and formulates a decision rule. A problem 
of this kind could be exemplified by a choice among complex socio-economic sys- 
t e m s .  W e  shall r e f e r  t o  this class of problems as criteria-ezperts choice p r o b  
lems. 
The character is t ic  feature of decision problems is t he i r  novelty to decision 
makers. In some cases,  with repetit ive decisions, i t  i s  possible (on the basis of in- 
formation about the implications of preceding decisions) to elaborate  the  best de- 
cision rule.  In o the r  cases one can define the best approximation f o r  complex 
choice ru les  [5]. Much more complex a r e  the  problems of unique choice, in which 
e i ther  the  problem itself o r  the  choice environment a r e  new. 
The proposed classification of choice problems i s  presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. 
Examples of different types of problems are the following. The A- and C-type 
problems are problems of multicriteria mathematical programming. The typical 
example of B-type i s  a choice of design parameters f o r  different machines [le]. 
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[7] and multicriteria decision making [ll]. The example of G-type problems is a 
problem of graduate admission [3]. F-type problems are frequently encountered in 
everyday life (job choice). W e  can cope with H-type problems by construction ex- 
perts  systems. 
2. Axiomatic Methods and their Critique 
The 1970s s a w  the final completion of the axiomatic decision theory based on 
the classic expected utility theory of Von Neuman and Morgenstern [13]. For the 
most  common multicriterion decision problems, the axiomatic theory w a s  logically 
embodied in MAUT - multicriterion (or multiattribute) utility theory. The methods, 
of axiomatic nature, a r e  described in detafl in [16]. These techniques involve the 
following: the problem of evaluation of decision alternatives is  confined to the 
problem of axiomatic validation and construction of a utility function. Each set of 
axioms (e.g. axiom of existence, axiom of 'resolution', axiom of independence (cf. 
Fishburn, [5])) is  related to a specific type of utility function. The validity of ax- 
ioms is  determined on the basis of information furnished by the decision maker. 
Depending on the data obtained, an inference i s  made that  a particular type of util- 
ity function is appropriate. 
From the formal point of view MAUT seems explicit and correct .  Probably, 
therefore, many people t r ea t  this theory as the only scientifically-based validation 
of decision methods. 
Along with the works on MAUT construction, the mid-1970s witnessed the e m e r -  
gence of new papers questioning the very fundamentals of axiomatic methods, i.e. 
questioning their  ways of eliciting data from experts and decision makers. In rela- 
tion t o  expected utility theory, this kind of paper had appeared still earlier (e.g. 
the well-known Allais paradox; Raiffa [14]). However, the crucial article in this 
respect w a s  the one by Tversky and Kahneman [I91 which casts doubt on the possi- 
bility of correctly obtaining event probability estimates. Such possibilities w e r e  
not questioned a t  all in the well-known works on validation of axiomatic techniques. 
The Tversky and Kahneman papers were accompanied by the works of Slovic, 
Lichtenstein, and Fischoff, providing an analysis of actual human behavior in com- 
plex decision problems [17]. The general conclusion from all these works seems 
ra the r  unfavorable for  the MAUT proponents: the capacities of human beings in 
information processing are ra ther  limited and only the flexibility of humans, their  
ability to adapt, conceals these constraints from researchers. 
The recent  works mentioned above a r e  descriptive and study human behavior 
in decision problems. Thei behavior is not simply a deviation from the  'optimal' 
one (relating t o  the expected behavior within the normative techniques) - i t  is  en- 
t irely different in nature from the assumptions in the ea r l i e r  model. This questions 
a r e  the very fundamentals of MAUT. 
Due t o  all this, the cu r r en t  state-of-the-art of decision theory and methods is 
r a t h e r  obscure. The most solid s t ruc ture  of decision theory - MAUT - is  seriously 
shaken: the MAUT-based techniques a r e  at least in no way superior  t o  other ,  so- 
called heuristic methods. In fact ,  there  are many such methods in decision making 
practice.  There a r e  the well-known direct  incomparability threshold techniques, 
man-machine techniques and the like. Many have been successfully applied t o  
practical problems. 
Of course,  many of the existing decision techniques a r e  well suited t o  the  
peculiarities of par t icular  practical problems. No doubt they a r e  quite useful. 
But there  is always a question: can the re  be a scientific basis f o r  choice of a par-  
t icular decision technique? How can one distinguish between the 'suitable' and 'un- 
suitable' methods fo r  different practical situations? 
2.1 Capacities of man in decision problems and their limits 
The question of what man can and cannot do in  decision problems is at present 
one of the  most debatable. A s  was previously mentioned , a number of papers  in 
recent  years  had conclusions pointing t o  the limited capabilities of man in 
numerous decision problems [15, 191. 
What can we confidently say  about the actual capabilities of decision makers 
and exper t s  in decision problems? First  of all, i t  i s  worth noting tha t  the capabili- 
t ies of human beings depend, t o  a considerable degree, on the type of problem han- 
dled. Second, they depend heavily on the way of obtaining the relevant information 
from people. 
First  of all ,  l e t  us review the basic (and most indisputable) facts  characteriz- 
ing the human information processing system. A t  present,  the majority of psychol- 
ogists believe tha t  the hypothesis tha t  people possess both short-term and long- 
term memories i s  r a t h e r  credible,  and tha t  the short-term memory capacity is very 
limited: i t  contains seven blocks, seven s tructural  da ta  units [El. Simon [l6] be- 
lieves that  
the evidence is overwhelming tha t  the h u m a n  information processing 
system is bas ica l ly  ser ia l  in  i t s  operation: tha t  i t  can  process on ly  a 
symbols a t  a time a n d  that  the symbols being processed must  be 
held in special,  l imited memory s t ruc ture s  whose content c a n  be 
changed r a p i d l y .  (p .53 )  
The limited size of short-term memory means that  one has  t o  adapt t o  problems 
which involve complex information processing, seeking ways to find t he  solution. 
Hence i t  i s  worth mentioning p las t i c i t y  as the second major character is t ic  of man 
when processing complex information. Man ei ther  adapts to a complex problem or 
adapts  i t  t o  his own capacities. Several  heuristics may be  used by people in han- 
dling complex multicriterion choice problems [12]. 
Heuristic methods may also be employed by people when assigning probabilis- 
t ic  estimated [19]. 
The th i rd  key characteristic of a man is his ability f o r  learning from his pre-  
vious actions (most often by trial-and-error technique). As a resul t ,  long-term 
memory (with i ts  practically unlimited capacity) accumulates data  on preceding 
problems and the outcomes of t he i r  solutions. 
These t h r e e  major character is t ics  of the human information processing sys- 
t e m  throw light on people's behavior in various decision problems. I t  i s  clear that 
in case of repetit ive decision problems man can accumulate in long-term memory 
the  standard form of the problems and the respective solutions worked out in the 
process  of learning. 
The decision maker's capacity in holistic choice problems are enormous as he  
i s  able  t o  use his gestalt  of the alternatives as a s t ruc tura l  data  unit. As a rule, 
this gestal t  i s  m o r e  complete than the respective set of a t t r ibutes  characterizing 
the  alternatives.  
The problem which are m o s t  complex to handle are those 'unique cr i ter ia-  
exper t s  choice' problems where one i s  unable t o  pick out  a s tandard decision or a 
holistic image of the  alternatives from long-term m e m o r y  as none i s  available. 
When facing such problems, t he  decision maker has  t o  consider separately the as- 
sessments of the alternatives on all relevant c r i t e r i a ,  which i s  an  excessive load 
on short-term memory. This can  lead to conflicting and differing answers on the 
p a r t  of decision makers and to the application of simplistic heuristics. 
number of classes to decide between (from t w o  to four)  in one and the  s a m e  prob- 
lem, the subjects considerably simplified the i r  s t ra tegies .  The increased pressure  
on the frame of re fe rence  forced the  subjects to switch t o  quite primitive w a y s  of 
t ransferr ing a p a r t  of t he  set of c r i t e r i a  t o  act as constraints. 
Thus a large body of r e sea rch  confirms the  limited capabilities of decision 
makers with respec t  to decision problems. The constraints on the way a problem 
can be handled depend considerably on the  type of problem, t he  way the  data  i s  eli- 
cited, and on the  complexity of t h e  problem. Of course,  t he re  i s  a marked depen- 
dence on the  motivation of the person who i s  handling t h e  problem. With any given 
amount t he  motivation, however, t he re  are sti l l  cer ta in  limits to decision makers 
capabilities. Often i t  is hard  to identify these limits, as they may be  disguised 
through the  ability of a person t o  adapt to a specific problem. Thus, in a problem 
involving the  d i rec t  evaluation of multiattributed alternatives,  only the  analysis of 
the  decision maker's decisions according t o  t he  c r i t e r i a  of transitivity, stability, 
and the  complexity of t he  decision rule  employed provides the possibility of identi- 
fying the  actual capabilities of the  decision maker. The application of any of these 
t h r e e  c r i t e r i a  on i t s  own does not provide an  adequate understanding of t he  deci- 
sion maker 's  behavior. 
3. Analysis of Elementary Operations of a Deciaion Haker 
New results in psychological research  give us the  possibility to study existing 
decision making methods from the  psychological point of view. 
A question a r i s e s  how t o  estimate the validity of those methods. The following 
approach is suggested: i t  i s  necessary to study thoroughly t h e  phases of a deci- 
sion maker's choice while segregating simple information processing operations. 
Then the  decision maker's capabilities in performing these operations must be  
evaluated. Such estimates permit us to character ize  t he  validity of decision 
methods as a whole. 
Al l  information processing operations performed by a decision maker may be  
classified into t h r e e  groups: operation with c r i te r ia ;  operation with values of cr i -  
t e r ia ;  operation with alternatives.  
An opera ti or^ is r e f e r r e d  to as elementary one if i t  cannot be broken down t o  
o the r  operations associated with the  objects of the  same group. 
All  these operations are classified by the following categories: 
complex (C), if t h e r e  are results of psychological research  indicating 
that  in implementing these operations the decision maker makes a lot of 
contradictions o r  employs simplified s t rategies  (e.g. disregard some of 
the  cr i ter ia) ;  
admissible (A), if t he re  are results of psychological research  indicating 
tha t  e i t he r  these operation are routine f o r  the  decision maker or t he re  
are indications tha t  he is able to perform them with a small number of 
contradictions and using complex strategies,  for  example, combination of 
c r i te r ia  values; 
uncertain (Us UC, UA), if t he re  are no results of psychological research  
concerning these operations, but by analogy with the  known facts w e  can 
make a preliminary conclusion about admissibility (UA) o r  complexity 
(UC) of an  operation. 
On the basis of a review of existing multicriteria methods the l ist  of elementa- 
ry operations [I] i s  formulated (see Table l). 
The detailed explanation of elementary operation's general estimates is given 
in [4]. Those estimates can be  explained in many cases by main characteristics of 
human information processing system which were analyzed in [4, 101. 
On the  basis of estimates of elementary operations w e  can evaluate the validi- 
ty of many existing decision making methods. Two examples i l lustrate the idea. 
(1) The method of weighted sum of c r i t e r i a  estimates. The utility (U) of mul- 
t icr i ter ia  object i s  equal t o  
where zi - an  estimate of the object on i-th cr i ter ion (i = 1 ,  ..., N), wi - 
weight of i-th cr i ter ion.  
This method is based on operation 011 which is complex. There are 
results of psychological studies indicating the decision maker provides a lot 
of contradictions. So, this method invalid from this point of view. 
(2) Geoffrion-Dyer method [6] f o r  multicriteria l inear programming prob- 
lems. The operation performed by a decision maker in the  framework of 
this method can be decomposed t o  023 and 031. These operations are 
complex. 
Table 1. 
Operation number Name of elementary operation General estimate 
01 Operational with c r i te r ia  
Assignment of c r i t e r i a  weights 
Criteria ordering by significance 
Nomination of probabilities 
02 Operations with cr i ter ion estimations 
of one alternative 
Comparison of two values on a 
single cr i ter ion scale 
Comparison of two c r i t e r i a  values variation 
Quantitative definition of a 
cr i ter ion vallues variation tha t  
i s  equivalent t o  variation of 
another  cr i ter ion value 
Assignment of satisfactory value 
by single cr i ter ion 
03 Operations with multicriteria alternatives 
Comparison of two alternatives and 
identification of the  be t t e r  one 
Choice of the best (worst) 
alternative from a s e t  
Determination of an  "ideal" alternative 
the degree of proximity to which determines 
the quality of the cu r r en t  solution 
Comparison of holistic images of U A 
two alternatives 
Classification of alternatives A* 
*Depends on the size of the problem. 
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